Impact of the National Practitioner Data Bank on Resolution of Malpractice Claims
Policymakers and commentators are concerned that the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) has influenced malpractice litigation dynamics. This study examines whether the introduction of the NPDB changed the outcomes, process, and equity of malpractice litigation. Using pre-and post-NPDB analyses, we examine rates of unpaid claims, trials, resolution time, physician defense costs, and payments on claims with a low/high probability of negligence. We find that physicians and their insurers have been less likely to settle claims since introduction of the NPDB, especially for payments less than $50,000. Because this disruption appears to have decreased the proportion of questionable claims receiving compensation, the NPDB actually may have increased overall tort system specificity.
The National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) was established by the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 and began receiving reports on September 1, 1990 (Health Care Quality Improvement Act 1986 Health Resources and Services Administration 2002) . Its goal is to improve the quality of medical care generally, and the process of medical peer review specifically, by providing useful information for assessing the professional competence of health care practitioners. The NPDB receives and stores data, disseminating information to mandated or authorized queriers about ''adverse actions'' taken against any licensed health care practi-tioners, including physicians, dentists, nurses, podiatrists, and chiropractors. Responsibility for management of the data bank resides with the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), part of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (Demos 1991; Pugsley 1990; Robb 1992; Rothschild 1992) .
Any entity taking a reportable adverse action against a practitioner or making a medical malpractice payment on behalf of a practitioner is required to report to the NPDB within 30 days. Nonreporters risk stiff civil penalties. Reportable actions include interventions by professional or state oversight authorities that affect practitioners' licensure, clinical privileges, professional society membership, and drug dispensing authority. Hospitals must query the NPDB about health care professionals when they apply for clinical privileges, and then biannually during re-credentialing. Other health care organizations, such as physician groups, health maintenance organizations, and preferred provider organizations are encouraged to use the NPDB if they exercise significant peer review action or professional control.
Despite the range of adverse actions and practitioners covered by the NPDB regulations, physician malpractice payments constitute by far the largest share of reports; they account for approximately 20,000 per year, or three-quarters of the incoming data (HRSA 2002) . We focus on physician malpractice reports in this study.
The NPDB's requirement that any payment of a malpractice claim must be reported, regardless of its size, has been controversial from the outset. Supporters draw upon evidence suggesting that even small settlements may be predictive of future malpractice and possibly reflect poor quality care (Rolph, Pekelney, and McGuigan 1993; Bovbjerg and Petronis 1994; Horner 1990 ). Critics charge that this requirement has raised the stakes in settling claims for physicians-the vast majority of whom are insured for malpractice payments up to generous limits-by introducing an important new ''reputation'' cost (Priest and Klein 1984) . The result, it is argued, is that the NPDB has chilled physicians' willingness to settle claims (Ryzen 1992; Walcoff and Associates 1995) . If true, this is a potentially serious repercussion because of the critical role that settlement plays in promoting efficiency and equity in the litigation process (Kritzer 1991; Metzloff 1988; Gross and Syverud 1991) . Malpractice settlements avert costly trials, dispose of worthy claims expeditiously, and spare defendants and plaintiffs the anxiety of protracted disputes.
With few notable exceptions, the impact of the NPDB remains largely unstudied (Mullan et al. 1992; Baldwin et al. 1999) . The purpose of this paper is to investigate the hypothesis that the introduction of the NPDB altered the dynamics of malpractice litigation by making physicians (and their insurers) more reluctant to settle claims. In the next section, we present a theoretical framework to model the impact of NPDB reporting and develop several testable hypotheses. This is followed by a discussion of our data collection efforts, the development of measures, and the methods used to test the model empirically. Finally, study results are presented and discussed.
Theoretical Framework
The malpractice resolution process involves a complex interaction of bargaining and strategic behavior that is influenced by financial, legal, and demographic factors beyond the ''merit'' of the case. Danzon and Lillard (1982) have provided a theoretical framework for modeling the resolution of malpractice claims. We start with this framework, and extend the model to focus on the effect of introducing a new nonmonetary cost to defendants in the form of the NPDB reporting requirements. Danzon and Lillard (1982) note that for each claim, there is some probability (W) that the plaintiff would win at trial and get a potential award at verdict (V), conditional on winning. The probability of winning (W) represents the propensity of the court to favor the plaintiff and depends on the facts of the case, the quality of the evidence, and the laws defining liability and burden of proof (Danzon and Lillard 1982; Daniels 1990; Waldfogel 1995) . The potential award (V) depends on case characteristics such as the severity of the injury and the level of compensable damages (Danzon and Lillard 1982; Ramseyer and Makazato 1989) . Compensable damages include both economic losses (wages, medical, and other out-of-pocket costs) and noneconomic losses (''pain and suffering,'' loss of consortium).
Plaintiffs (patients) and defendants (physicians) consider the probability of a plaintiff win (W) and potential award (V), as well as their own expected litigation costs, when considering whether to drop a case (i.e., no payment), settle (payment of agreed-upon amount, prior to trial), or proceed to trial. 1 We can model the plaintiff's ''minimum ask'' (A) as follows:
where W P is the plaintiff's expected probability of winning, V P is the plaintiff's expected potential award, conditional on winning, and X P is the plaintiff's expected litigation costs. 2 Note that if the expected litigation costs (X P ) exceed the plaintiff's expected benefit (W P ÁV P ) then the case will be dropped. We can model the defendant's ''maximum offer'' (M) as follows:
where W D is the defendant's expectation of a plaintiff win, V D is the defendant's expectation of the award, conditional on a plaintiff win, and X D is the defendant's expected litigation costs. This model yields a number of important implications related to the size of the transaction costs, the size of key parameters (W, V), and the relative expectations of plaintiffs and defendants over these parameters. First, when the plaintiff's minimum ask is less than the defendant's maximum offer (A , M), the case should settle before trial, because to do so will save litigation costs for both sides. Second, the presence of transaction costs (X) creates a zone of overlap or bargaining range, and this zone is positively related to the size of these transaction costs. Consider the special case in which litigants' expectations over the (plaintiff) benefit of the case are equal (W P ÁV P ¼ W D ÁV D ). In this case, the zone of overlap would be determined totally by the transaction costs (X P þ X D ). Third, the model also implies that, ceterus paribus, cases with a low probability of winning (W) or cases with a low expected award (V) yield low expected benefits to the plaintiff and are likely to be dropped. Finally, the plaintiff's expectations of the probability of winning (W P ) and the value of an award conditional on winning (V P ) can differ significantly from the defendant's expectations of those same parameters (W D , V D ), either increasing or decreasing/ eliminating the bargaining range. Ongoing legal discovery activities in preparation for trial may supply information used to update plaintiff or defendant expectations, providing new opportunities for decision making. Whenever expectations are updated, the plaintiff may revise his or her minimum ask (A) and re-evaluate whether to drop the case (A , 0) or proceed (A . 0). Similarly, the physician defendant also may update his maximum offer (M) given such new information. An update of either A or M may bring one or both sides into the overlap zone and trigger a settlement.
Previous studies have modeled the choices to settle, drop, or proceed to trial as economic decisions, in which defendants and plaintiffs weigh the monetary and nonmonetary costs of all op-tions (Mnookin and Kornhauser 1979; Danzon and Lillard 1982; Priest 1985; Ramseyer and Makazato 1989; Kritzer 1991; Siegelman and Waldfogel 1999; Sieg 2000) . In the context of Danzon and Lillard's (1982) theoretical framework, we can construe a report to the NPDB as an additional cost imposed on physician defendants. Since many credentialing organizations view data from the NPDB when considering employment or admitting privilege applications of physicians, the report may adversely affect a physician's reputation, job opportunities, and financial success. If an individual physician (i) assesses the cost of a particular NPDB report to be (R i ), the defendant's maximum offer becomes:
The presence of the additional costs (R i ) yields two important implications. First, these additional costs may reduce or even eliminate the zone of overlap, decreasing the probability of settlement. If parties also update expectations over time through the discovery process, these unsettled cases eventually may be dropped (when updated W P ÁV P ÿ X P , 0). Since some cases that previously would have been settled (pre-NPDB) now continue to be in the pool of cases resistant to settlement until they are eventually dropped or tried, the model predicts an increase in both trial rates and the rate of dropped cases. Our expanded model also predicts that for cases with relatively low expected value in the eyes of the defendant (i.e., small W D ÁV D ), the additional reputation costs may be large enough to eliminate any offer at all from the defendant (M , 0). Thus, relatively low value or ''small'' cases will be especially affected by the presence of the additional reputation costs and disproportionately fewer of them will be settled post-NPDB.
In the empirical analysis that follows, we test the predictions of our model. Specifically, we hypothesize that after implementation of the NPDB:
1. The rate of malpractice cases that are dropped will increase; 2. The rate of trials associated with malpractice cases will increase; 3. The length of time to claim resolution and the litigation costs associated with the claim will increase, since cases are less likely to settle early; and 4. Small claims will be disproportionately affected, becoming less likely to settle post-NPDB relative to larger claims.
Methods

Study Design
To examine the impact of the NPDB on malpractice litigation outcomes, we gathered information on claims against more than 3,500 physician defendants. The claims were closed (resolved) in 29 states 3 during three time periods: a ''pre-NPDB period,'' the 12-month period beginning two years prior to the introduction of the NPDB (Sept. 1, 1988 , to Aug. 31, 1989 ; an ''immediate post-NPDB period,'' the second year of operation (Sept. 1, 1991 , to Aug. 31, 1992 ; and a ''longterm post-NPDB period,'' the fifth year of operation (Sept. 1, 1995 , to Aug. 31, 1996 . Two post-NPDB time periods were examined because various frictions may have delayed market adjustment to the new reporting system. We avoided the years immediately before and after the date of first reports because anecdotal evidence suggested that litigation behavior changed in the shadow of the NPDB, with a flurry of settlements transacted in the months before Sept. 1, 1990 1, (Mullan et al. 1992 . We categorized claims by date of closure, rather than date of alleged incident or claim, because the reporting requirement is triggered by payment.
Our analyses focused on five main outcomes: 1) the rate of dropped claims, 2) the rate of claims proceeding to trial, 3) the length of time to claim resolution, 4) the litigation costs associated with claims, and 5) the settlement of small claims. We also explored whether changes in settlement behavior affected the tort system's capacity to operate as a fair mechanism for distributing compensation. We used multivariate techniques to control for a range of factors previously shown to influence the course and outcomes of malpractice claims (Danzon and Lillard 1982; Sloan et al. 1989; Gross and Syverud 1991; Taragin et al. 1992; Burstin et al. 1993; Taragin et al. 1994; Brennan, Sox, and Burstin 1996; Kessler, Meites and Miller 1996; Studdert et al. 2000) .
Data Sources and Sampling
We collaborated with four commercial insurers to assemble a database of claims from the pre-and post-NPDB periods. Three of the insurers operate as leading medical malpractice carriers in their respective states of Massachusetts, Colorado, and Utah; the fourth is a large, multistate carrier, one of the five largest in the country.
All eligible claims at three insurers (Massachusetts, Colorado, national) were in our sample, but only 360 claims (120 each period) were randomly sampled from among eligible claims in Utah because of the relatively high cost of review at that site. Eligibility was determined according to the following criteria: the claim had to be a formal demand for compensation, as opposed to an incident report; the claim had to relate to the provision of medical care; and, unless an indemnity payment of any amount was made, at least $1,000 in administrative expenses must have been incurred in management of the claim. The latter criterion was designed to exclude demands with little or no follow-up activity that did not mature into full-fledged claims.
A total of 3,304 claim files were sampled: 397 in Massachusetts; 360 in Utah; 705 in Colorado; and 1,842 in 26 other states covered by the national insurer. Abstraction was successfully completed on 3,027 (92.7%) of these files (95.7% in Massachusetts, 69.1% in Utah, 97.8% in Colorado, and 93.6% of the national sample), yielding information on the outcomes of malpractice actions against 3,596 physicians. The rest did not meet our definition of an eligible claim, contained insufficient information to complete the Claims File Abstraction Form (CFAF) or were classified as missing. Table 1 provides descriptive characteristics for the study sample.
Comparing the geography of our sample with statistics on reports made to the NPDB, we drew claims from 17 of the 24 states with the highest frequency of reports. Due to the use of insurers in Massachusetts, Colorado, and Utah, claims from these states are over-represented in our sample relative to rates of reports to the NPDB. New York and California, the states with the highest reporting frequencies, are under-represented. Thus, while our sample provides a fairly broad cross-section of claims from different states, it is not a nationally representative one by state.
Claims File Abstraction
Teams of abstractors reviewed the sampled claims files on site during the period January through October 1998. Key details from each sampled claim were abstracted: dates of initiation and closure; physician specialty; plaintiff residence, age, and gender; severity of injury (classified according to the 9-point scale developed by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners) (Sowka 1980) ; indemnity and expense reserves (amounts set aside by the insurance company to cover estimated costs of the claim and re-estimated periodically to incorporate new information); total indemnity payment (if any); expenses incurred by the defendant insurer in managing the claim; and disposition of claim (dropped, paid, resolved at/after trial).
To test the reliability of the abstractors' work, we randomly selected 10% of the sample for rereview by an on-site abstractor who had not previously reviewed the file. Because medical malpractice trials are infrequent events (ranging from 5% to 25% of claims, depending on region) (Simmons 1996) , but an important outcome measure in our study, one-third of the subsample for re-review was drawn from among cases that proceeded to trial. Inter-rater reliability was extremely high, an expected result given the explicit nature of the key variables collected in file abstraction. Kappa scores for agreement on whether the claim was dropped or proceeded to trial were .96 (95% confidence interval [CI], .91-1.0) and 1.0 (i.e., perfect agreement), respectively. The Shrout-Fleiss interclass correlation coefficients for interrater reliability on months to resolution and defense costs (logged) were .96 and .92, respectively (Shrout and Fleiss 1979) .
Legislative Index, Specialty Categorization, and Measure of Negligence
To account for the variability in state laws that affect litigation, we linked each plaintiff's state of residence with longitudinal information about the local legislative environment, building on previous work in this area (Spernak and Budetti 1993) . Specifically, we constructed Likert scales characterizing six dimensions of state malpractice law: requirements for pre-trial screening, statute of limitations, qualifications for expert witnesses, joint and several liability, damages caps, and attorney fee limits. For each dimension and time period, states were ranked according to the likelihood that their laws would discourage medical malpractice litigation, and then they independently were assigned values ranging from 1 (least likely to discourage) to 7 (mostly likely to discourage) by a legal research assistant and one investigator (T. Waters). Average values for each state/time period then were determined.
Physicians in different specialties differ both in their probability of being sued and, when sued, the probability associated with the different outcomes of litigation (Sloan et al. 1989; Taragin et al. 1992; Taragin et al. 1994) . To control for mix of specialties among defendants as an independent source of variation in malpractice litigation over our study's six-year time span, we developed a four-tiered set of physician specialty categories based on the average annual number of professional liability claims per 100 physicians, by specialty, for the years 1989-96, as reported in the American Medical Association's Socioeco-nomic Characteristics of Medical Practice. We then assigned each physician in the sample to one of the four levels based on their primary specialty.
Data on the indemnity reserves set aside by the insurance company were used to develop a measure of the probability that the defendant's conduct involved negligence. To comply with reinsurance requirements and financial accounting standards, malpractice insurance companies estimate their potential cost exposure on each claim and set aside this money as a claim against their assets. Recall from our theoretical model that the expected benefit of a case (benefit to the plaintiff, cost to the defendant) is a function of the expected probability of a plaintiff win (W) and the value of the case, contingent on a plaintiff win (V). Hence, in theory, reserves set aside by the defendant's malpractice insurer should represent the product of the insurer's prediction of the value of the case and the probability that a payment will be necessary. Extensive discussions with claims adjusters at each of our participating insurers confirmed these estimates as two guiding key parameters used in setting reserves, although none reported undertaking the calculus as a precise mathematical calculation.
Since we observe the severity of injury associated with each claim, and severity of injury is closely associated with the first parameter-value of the claim-we were able to combine information on severity score with the reserve amount to estimate the probability of a plaintiff win (W). We divided cases into three categories of probable negligence (high, medium, low) based on the magnitude of their reserves relative to other cases in the same injury severity category. When reserve amounts were to change over the life of a claim, we used the median value. Cases with reserves exceeding the 75 th percentile for all cases in the severity category were classified as having a high probability of negligence; those below the 25 th percentile were classified as low probability. In summary, this approach holds constant the cost of the claim and uses variation in reserves as a proxy measure of negligence.
Time to resolution was defined as the number of days between claim and closure. Defense costs were abstracted from insurer files. All dollar amounts (defense costs, reserves, settlement amounts) were adjusted for inflation and reported in 1996 dollars.
Data Analysis
Pre-post analyses were used to investigate the impact of NPDB reporting on malpractice litigation outcomes. 4 We used multivariate logistic regression techniques to estimate the impact of the NPDB on probability of dropped claims, trial, and small settlements. To measure changes in time to resolution and defense costs in the post-NPDB periods, we used hazard and log-linear regression techniques, respectively. Because the assumption of proportionality was not met with a standard Cox analysis, we explored alternative error distributions (Wiebull, exponential) in the time-to-resolution and defense cost analyses.
The claims files contained little information on codefendants not insured by the index insurer. Therefore, such defendants were not included in our sample. In situations where the plaintiff filed against multiple defendants insured by the index insurer, information on all codefendants was typically aggregated into one claims file. We used each individual defendant as the unit of analysis in the regression models. Some provider (e.g., specialty) and case (e.g., settlement amount, settlement date) characteristics varied among codefendants; other characteristics were fixed within clusters of defendants (reserve, plaintiff characteristics, legislative environment, probability of negligence). Because the insurers did not disaggregate defense costs by defendant, we allocated these costs to each defendant according to the percentage of the total indemnity paid on his/ her behalf. If no payment was made, defense costs were allocated equally among the named defendants.
Results
Impact on Outcome of Claims: Physicians' Willingness to Settle
The NPDB did not have a significant impact on dropped claims in the short term (Table 2) . However, the probability of dropped claims increased significantly in the long term (odds ratio [OR] ¼ 1.70; 95% CI, 1.43-2.03). The analysis of dropped claims performed well in a Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test (p ¼ .24) (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989) . In univariate analyses, trial rates did not differ significantly in the short term (22.49% vs. 20.34%; p ¼ .21, x 2 ), and actually fell in the long term (12.63%; p , .01), although these results could not be verified with multivariate analyses due to poor performance on the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test (p , .01), perhaps reflecting the inherent difficulty of using case characteristics to predict trial rates. Table 3 shows that the probability of claims receiving payments of less than $50,000 decreased quite dramatically relative to any other type of settlement (i.e., dropped or settlement !$50,000).
To test the robustness of these findings, we redefined small claims using a series of thresholds ranging from $10,000 to $100,000. All of the versions of this analysis produced statistically significant odds ratios of similar magnitude.
Impact on Resolution Process: Cost and Time to Resolution
In separate analyses, we tested the impact of the NPDB on physician defense costs and time to resolution, defined in a survival model as days from initiation of claim to closure. On average, defense costs per case increased by $1,148 (p , .01), or approximately 4.3%, in the immediate post-NPDB period. We detected a small but statistically significant decrease (hazard ratio ¼ 1.11, p ¼ .02 [Wiebull]; hazard ratio ¼ 1.09, p ¼ .05 [exponential]) in the time taken to resolve claims in the long-term post-NPDB period.
Equity Impact
A key measure of equity in tort litigation is the extent to which meritorious claims attract compensation, and nonmeritorious claims do not. Approximately one-third of claims with ostensibly high probability of involving negligence were dropped in the pre-NPDB period ( Table 4 ). The proportion of dropped claims in this group increased slightly after 1990, although the change was not statistically significant. On the other hand, the proportion of claims that were paid despite exhibiting a low probability of negligence decreased by approximately 30% in the long term (p , .01).
Because we used a probabilistic method to make the negligence estimates, the relative change observed across time periods, rather than the absolute values, are particularly noteworthy. The temporal changes suggest that one effect of the NPDB has been to decrease the proportion of nonmeritorious claims that receive compensation. To examine the sensitivity of these results to the thresholds chosen (25 th and 75 th percentiles), we demarcated high and low probability of negligence claims using alternative cutoff points: ,10 th and .90 th ; ,20 th and .80 th ; and ,40 th and .60 th . All alternative formulations produced similar results, with one exception: the ,10 th and .90 th percentile produced a statistically significant increase in dropped claims among those with high probability of negligence (Period 1: 17.6%; Period 2: 30.4%; Period 3: 35.1%; p , .05).
Discussion
We found strong evidence that the NPDB has affected the malpractice litigation process. Six years after the NPDB commenced operation, the probability that any given claim would attract payment fell to 59% (1/1.70) of pre-NPDB levels. The reduction was especially pronounced among small claims, where the probability of a claim settling subsequent to introduction of the NPDB decreased by one-half in the long term.
Previous theoretical and experimental findings help to explain the behavioral change we observed (Danzon and Lillard 1982; Cooter, Marks, and Mnookin 1982; Priest and Klein 1984; Kritzer 1991; Loewenstein et al. 1993) . Payments on small claims in the post-NPDB period should be prone to reduction for two reasons. First, some proportion of these payments likely are made for convenience, independent of the merits of the claim; post-NPDB, such payments may seem less expedient to payers/defendants. Second, in a post-NPDB environment, the significant costs that plaintiffs (and their attorneys) face in pressing small claims to trial simply may not be justifiable, regardless of their likelihood of success before a jury. It is striking to note that the overall magnitude of the increase in the rate of dropped claims that we identified approximates the discrepancy between actual and predicted reporting levels previously noted by commentators (Mullan et al. 1992) , who often have cited under-reporting and corporate shielding as possible culprits. Our analysis was not designed to explore this discrepancy specifically. Nonetheless, our findings suggest that the lower-than-expected number of malpractice payment reports may be attributable, at least in part, to a general increase in dropped claims.
In addition to increasing the probability that claims will be dropped, we hypothesized that the NPDB may have increased time to resolution and defense costs. Findings from these analyses were mixed, and showed only small effects. We found no evidence that claims have become more drawn out in the wake of the NPDB. Moreover, our estimates suggest that the growth in defense costs per case translates into administrative cost increases among defendants nationally of approximately $30.6 million per year, a relatively small amount. Even when these costs are doubled to account for corresponding increases in plaintiff attorneys' management of claims, the increase represents less than 1% of annual physician malpractice premiums (Weiler et al. 1993) .
Our research also sheds light on which claims appear to be most affected by the NPDB. We identified small claims as an area where the reduction in payments was particularly strong in both the immediate and long-term post-NPDB periods. However, since it was not obvious, a priori, whether an overall reduction in the payment of these claims was a positive or negative development, we sought to further evaluate the reduction by examining the probable merits of particular claims. To date, medical record review is the only method used to make independent determinations about the merits of individual claims (Localio et al. 1991; Studdert et al. 2000) . This method is prohibitively expensive for most studies, and its reliability has been questioned (Anderson 1997) . In this study, we drew upon claims adjusters' expertise about the merits of cases, as articulated through indemnity reserves, to test negligence.
Our analysis detected a large (30%) and statistically significant reduction in the proportion of claims with low probability of negligence that received payments. One interpretation of this finding is that the ''shock'' to the litigation system caused by the NPDB was not necessarily an undesirable one from a societal perspective. On the contrary, the imposition of reporting and querying requirements actually may have sharpened the malpractice system's accuracy by bolstering incentives to deny spurious claims. Whether or not this phenomenon affects claiming behavior in the long run is an interesting subject for further analysis.
Our results are especially important in light of highly visible state efforts to make malpractice information public in recent years. In 1997, Massachusetts became the first state to put physician malpractice information on the World Wide Web. Between 1997 and 1999, nine other states 5 passed legislation to conduct similar efforts (Bushong 2000) . Our study suggests that this type of information disclosure to the general public could affect physician litigation and settlement behavior by imposing further ''settlement costs'' on physicians, although such behavioral changes would not necessarily be negative from a societal perspective.
Our study has several limitations. First, we were unable to explore the effect of the NPDB's introduction on behavioral changes outside the claims resolution process. For example, it also is possible that the specter of reporting payments has prompted physicians to exercise additional care or make other practice changes in order to avoid malpractice lawsuits. More directly relevant to our findings, plaintiff lawyers, most of whom are repeat players in litigation against physicians, may have become increasingly unwilling to bring certain weaker claims in the wake of the NPDB, believing that physicians would resist settlement more strongly than they had in the past. To the extent that such heightened vetting occurred, the increase in unpaid claims detected in our dropped and small claims analyses will underestimate the true impact of the NPDB on physicians' unwillingness to settle.
Second, insured physicians do not make unencumbered decisions about settlement; insurers play a key role, especially when the insured's policy includes so-called ''consent-to-settle'' clauses (Syverud 1990) . We discussed the mechanics of settlement decisions with senior administrators at each of the participating insurers. All had some version of consent-to-settle clauses in place that gave physicians input into decisions concerning claims resolution, although none ceded ultimate decision-making authority to the physician. The insured physician's capacity to influence settlement decisions may be particularly strong in our sample, given that two of our four participating insurers are physician-owned entities. To the extent that claims management is more autocratic elsewhere, our findings may overstate the NPDB's impact on settlement behavior.
Third, the pre/post methods we used are vulnerable to exogeneous trends over the study time period. Our multivariate analyses control for many of the factors understood to be associated with these trends. However, to the extent that we have not controlled for unidentified key factors that changed over this time period, our results will suffer from an omitted variables bias.
Finally, our method of negligence imputation is imperfect. If adjusters' estimation techniques for reserves depart from the methods we have assumed, the combination of reserves and injury severity will not yield accurate estimates of the probability of negligence. More important, even if adjusters follow the reserve calculus to the letter, our method conflates an assessment about the defendant's prospects of winning with one about underlying negligence. While evident negligence is clearly a principal factor, there is no doubt that adjusters consider factors ostensibly unrelated to the issue of negligence-in a birth injury claim, for example, a jury's likely sympathy for the plaintiff's disabled infant. Such confounders cloud the relationship between the probability of winning and the presence of negligence, marring our imputation technique. Nonetheless, their effect on cross-period variation, as opposed to absolute measurement of high and low probabilities, is highly questionable.
In summary, we found that the NPDB's reporting requirements have had a significant impact on medical malpractice litigation. Physicians appear to be more reluctant to settle claims, especially small ones and those where the probability of underlying negligence is low. However, it is not clear that this disruption constitutes an adverse impact on claims resolution. The economic and time costs of resolving claims have changed little, and the system's specificity in relation to meritorious claims actually may have improved.
Notes 1 Proceeding to trial and settlement is not always mutually exclusive in practice because some cases settle during trial. For purposes of our analyses, such cases still represent a failure to achieve agreement prior to trial and so we classified them as trials. 2 For simplicity, we posit a relatively simple functional form, although the results that follow only require A W , A V . 0, and A X , 0. 4 Three states in our sample (Florida, Indiana, and Maryland) collected malpractice and disciplinary data and permitted some level of public disclosure of this information prior to the introduction of the NPDB. Therefore, it is possible that the introduction of the NPDB would have less of an impact on settlement behavior in these states. We investigated this possibility through a differences-in-differences analysis, comparing changes in our four primary outcome variables between states with and without some pre-existing level of disclosure. None of these tests reveals significant differences. 5 Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
